

~~CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

This memorandum is for information only.

With further reference to the recently published book of Roger Hilsman, Jr., "Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions," which was reviewed in memorandum of June 27.

It now appears that much of the substance of Hilsman's book appeared in two earlier studies by him:

- (1) an unpublished thesis at Yale University, written probably about 1950 or 1951,
- (2) an abstract of that thesis, "Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs," which was published in October 1952 in "World Politics", a quarterly journal of Princeton University.

While Hilsman's Yale thesis evidently remained unpublished, it is presumably available to anyone interested.

An abstract of his thesis, published in "World Politics" in 1952, shows it is almost identical, in subject-matter scope, in style, and in sources used, to his later, lengthier book of 1956. The article, like the book, deals broadly with the relationship of central intelligence to the policy formulation staffs of the Government, and is based chiefly on the following materials: selected published hearings before Congress, 1945-47; published writings of George S. Pettes and Sherman Kent, 1946-49; and (most of all) numerous interviews by Hilsman with policy and intelligence officials. Some 65 such officials were interviewed, he says (p. 6 of the article). These interviews are

~~CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

apparently the same basic source as the 57-some unidentified and undated interviews which have been counted in his 1956 book. It appears that, whatever Hilsman has revealed about intelligence organization and methods in his 1956 book was, for the most part, already revealed in 1952, except, notably, for a number of references to the current organization and personnel of CIA. In 1952, for example, he mentioned Mr. Dulles as "now serving as a special advisor to the Director of CIA" (p. 4 note).

Hilsman's 1952 article is largely a critique of the processes by which policy decisions are made, and the relation of intelligence to those decisions. He doubts the power of experience, by itself, to lead to valid policy or intelligence. He says for example (p. 43):

...Although the operators recognize the importance of analysis and sober thought, they do not seem to understand the disciplined procedures of scientific research or the role of theory and conceptual tools in thinking. From all accounts, their thought-tools are often an ill-assorted collection of unrecognized or partly conscious cultural attitudes and prejudices; of logically inconsistent generalizations made from the haphazard samplings of reality that personal experience must ever be; of hypotheses fashioned from shibboleths, the imperfectly understood theories of others, and casually selected, partial information. Too frequently, it seems, their decisions are jerry-built of these materials, slapped together with defective logic, and placed on a narrow and shaky foundation of facts. And, amazingly, these criticisms made of the operators are also applicable to many of the intelligence people--the researchers supposedly hired for their analytical skills.

Hilsman would do away with most types of intelligence production, including basic intelligence ("encyclopedic country surveys"), current intelligence of all types, and the "formal periodic 'estimate' of the 'capabilities and intentions' of each nation" (p. 44); and he questions the need for "a large research and analysis unit" in intelligence (p. 39).

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
- 2 -

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

He would bring intelligence and policy people together into a single operation in which "researchers" and "operators" would adopt a "new" set of attitudes, which he calls "a frame of mind which is manipulative, instrumental, action-conscious, policy-oriented" (p. 44). Thereby he concludes, they would "move from hunch and intuition to an improved capacity for ... policy analysis" (pp. 44-45).

FOIA b3b



CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

25X1A9a

There is still another article by [REDACTED] published in April 1955, again in the "World Politics" quarterly, in which he makes some incidental observations on intelligence work in relation to military operations and planning. His article, entitled "Research and Military Affairs", is actually a review of several recent books by Sir John Slessor, Raymond L. Garthoff, C. N. Barclay, and others; it deals principally with the relationship of foreign policy formulation to military planning. Various Government agencies (other than CIA) are mentioned, including the JCS, SAC, and NSC.

25X1A9a

In the 1955 article, [REDACTED] offers, incidentally, an interesting historical interpretation on the non-political tradition of our military services. The barriers to any military domination of politics and policy-making are several, he says (p. 497), including:

... the country's long history of anti-militarism, the recruitment systems which create a corps of officers nurtured on those feelings, the officer rotation system, and especially the long-standing tradition, which is tightly woven into the whole fabric of American military custom, that the officer corps should be apolitical. The military in the United States, after all, take off their uniforms and put on civilian clothes the moment they are off duty, and do not hesitate to become shopkeepers and businessmen as soon as they retire--behavior at which Europeans, for example, never cease to marvel. Now and then a military hero may become President, but the Army as a whole has never pushed him there or followed him into politics when he arrived.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] concludes his 1955 article by distinguishing between "doers" and "thinkers" on military staffs. He says there are various obstacles to the use of "intellectuals" in military-planning and operational positions, and asserts that such officers are usually snubbed in intelligence work (p. 502):

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
- 4 -

There are, of course, intelligent generals, highly intelligent ones; but intelligence is not the same as intellectuality. There are even one or two intellectual generals, but they are generals partly because ambition, itself entirely commendable, has led them to muzzle their intellectuality at least in their professional field. For in the military, intellectuality is a talent like singing or piano playing: nice for parties, but suspect in more serious business. As the Old Man said to the young Melville Goodwin when he warned him against sticking his neck out to support a "singing" officer, no matter how capable he appeared to be, "when you're choosing personnel, select a good sound poker player or a golfer or someone who likes fishing, and you know where you are, because those types have stability. Put the prima donnas in Intelligence but keep them out of Operations." (Latter quotation taken by [REDACTED] from John P. Marquand, "Melville Goodwin, U. S. A., " published in 1951, p. 346).

25X1A9a

Copy of Hilsman's two articles herewith.

STANLEY J. GROGAN

Enclosures 2

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY